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THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND
OVERSEAS AIRLINES, 1918-1939,
A FAILURE OF LAISSEZ-FAIRE'
By ROBIN D. S. HIGHAM
University of North Carolina
T HE failure of the British government to grasp the fundamentals
of air transport in the period 1918-1939 led directly to the creation
of the British Overseas Airways Corporation. B.O.A.C. is symbolic
recognition that the Churchillian decree of 1920 (that civil aviation
must fly by itself without government support 2) was wrong. Civil
airlines cannot operate unaided in the face of subsidized international
competition however much the politicians want them to do so. Unfor-
tunately Britain's awareness of the realities of commercial aviation,
brought on by Hitler, came too late to prevent American monopoliza-
tion of the airliner market. Even the British themselves, despite some
notable designs, have been compelled to "buy American."
British power was based upon maritime and financial control of
world commerce, but this advantage was destroyed in the first two
decades of this century.
The First World War indicated the aeroplane's tremendous future
potentialities. In recognition of these, the British government estab-
lished in 1917 the Civil Aerial Transport Committee to investigate
and report on a peacetime program. Their Report Cd. 9218 was based
on maritime experience as aeronautical data was lacking. In this
respect its ideas were sound legally and commercially, but not strate-
gically.
As early as 1910 the Germans rightly grasped the fact that the aero-
plane would cause a shift in the strategic importance of Britain and
Germany. The British did not see that what had been a position of
strength in naval affairs would be one of weakness in aeronautics. Thus
they failed to agree to German proposals for freedom of the skies,
preferring instead their naval-inspired concept of sovereignty. Thus,
when their views were incorporated into international law in 1919,
1 This article is based on my doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1957.
2 126 H.C. Deb. 5. s., 1622, 11 March 1920.
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they provided Germany with the means for denying British companies
the use of the shortest route to Bagdad.
The International Convention for Aerial Navigation (I.C.A.N.)
was one of the more awkward of the many barriers erected by the
Peace Conference. Not only was the British position as laid out in
Cd. 9218, adopted, but also numerous countries were excluded com-
pletely. Germany was placed in a particularly obnoxious and obstruc-
tive position. The net results of this "sovereignty of the skies" policy
for the British were unexpected and unfortunate. The Instone Air
Line, an offshoot of the colliery company, and Imperial Airways, its
successor, were denied a line from Cologne to Prague; this scotched
plans for a London-Constantinople-Bagdad-Karachi route. British air-
liners were prohibited from crossing the Franco-Italian border until
1934. Basra-Karachi services were delayed from 1927 to 1929 and forced
to relocate in 1931. And Britons in Burma were denied a Rangoon-
Karachi air mail service by K.L.M. because this would have been
cabotage (an aeronautical coasting voyage) by a foreigner. As enacted
into British law in the Air Navigation Act of 1920, I.C.A.N. strongly
resembled the earlier maritime navigation acts.
Though perfectly well-intentioned, the British started into the
aeronautical age with a severe handicap. This was greatly increased
by the government's insistence that civil aviation fly by itself and the
politicians' inability to appreciate imperial-strategic, military-indus-
trial, or prestigious reasons for a brilliant air service. All of these had
been stressed by the 1917 committee. Moreover, the State had for
centuries maintained a close, and financial, interest in shipping and
seamen. In the nineteenth century and after, the Post Office had sub-
sidized shipping space whether it used it or not. Yet with the airlines
the government was reluctant to provide more than aerodromes and
navigational-communicational facilities and the Post Office refused to
pay for more than the actual number of surcharged letters carried. In
view of the precedents in English history, such actions were inexcusable.
After the advent of Hitler and the consequent Anglo-French rap-
prochement, the R.A.F. was munificently expanded and modernized.
At the same time a reluctant reappraisal of the role of overseas airlines
in the national interest, consciously or unconsciously, brought signifi-
cant charges. The Empire Air Mail Scheme, co-equality for British
Airways in subsidy, division and development of routes, and ultimately
the creation of B.O.A.C. all sought to remedy the years of neglect. But
war cut short a rationalization which would have placed B.O.A.C. in
a first-class competitive position all over the world by 1943.
From the Armistice in 191, to war in 1939 British overseas airline
development falls into four periods: free competition (1919-1921),
subsidiary experimentation (1921-1924), commercial monopoly (1924-
1936), and dual non-competitive monopoly culminating in B.O.A.C.
(1936-1939/40).
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I
The aircraft available in 1918 were hardly suited to commercial
operations. However, passenger carrying began immediately hostilities
ceased, with the establishment of official services from England to
British Army headquarters, the Peace Conference, and the army in
the Rhineland.
Commercial flying began in August 1919. British and French com-
panies operated from London to Paris and established lines to Amster-
dam, Brussels and Cologne. Almost immediately the usual symptoms
of commercial warfare appeared and were aggravated by international
tensions. The French, strongly backed by a State fearful of a revived
Germany, supported airlines as an auxiliary to a powerful air force.
The British companies (Aircraft Transport and Travel, Handley Page
Transport, and the Instone Air Line) were left to fend for themselves
without government support. The R.A.F. was rapidly reduced from
30,000 aircraft to 24. Under these conditions, it is hardly surprising
that French fare-cutting drove the British operators off the airways by
1921, with the result that British taxpayers' money went exclusively
for radio, meteorological and aerodrome facilities for the French
services.
II
Realization of this fact forced the government to take action. Secre-
tary of State for Colonies and Air Churchill appointed a small com-
mittee to produce immediate proposals for reviving cross-Channel
services. On 19 March 1921 Handley Page and Instone's re-commenced
operations under the "temporary" scheme which was designed to
support them till October when the "permanent" scheme was to be
instituted. It was, however, delayed till April 1922. Under the "tempo-
rary" scheme the Air Ministry was committed to the extent of £88,200,
while under the "permanent" this was increased to £200,000 per year.
In the interim business manipulations as a result of the effects of
the post-war depression forced the liquidation of Aircraft Transport
and Travel in 1920. By April 1922 Daimler Airway had been created
as its successor.
Thus, by fiscal 19223 three subsidized British companies (Handley
Page, Instone's, and Daimler) were competing on the London-Paris
route in opposition to the State-supported French. The incongruity
of such an extreme insistence on competition went unnoticed at first.
But owing to unexpected summer bad weather, the optimistic projec-
tion of the 1921 season failed to be realized. The airlines appealed
and a "revised" subsidy arrangement was initiated in October 1922.
3 The British government's fiscal year runs from 1 April to the following
31 March. Fortunately, most aeronautical statistical and financial materials were
and are kept on this basis, though answers in Parliament sometimes refer to
calendar years.
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This at last recognized the senselessness of inter-British competition
and reassigned routes in order of seniority. 4 Handley Page with the
slowest aircraft were given the highly-competitive London-Paris serv-
ice, Instone's retained the London-Brussels-Cologne route which they
had pioneered, and Daimler Airway, with the fastest aircraft, was given
the long Manchester-London-Amsterdam run pioneered by its fore-
bear, Aircraft Transport and Travel. In the summer of 1923 a service
by the British Marine Air Navigation Company between Southampton
and the Channel Islands was also included. Although Instone's were
denied Cologne-Prague-Middle East ambitions, Daimler was given
German approval for a joint service to Berlin with Aero Lloyd, a ship-
ping-combine ancestor of Deutsch Luft Hansa (D.L.H.).
Under the "temporary" scheme of 1921 the two companies had
carried 5,804 passengers on 1,072 subsidized single flights, while under
the "permanent" the three companies carried only 5,860 in 1,588 trips.5
Nineteen-twenty-three proved to be better. Whereas in the period
April 1922-March 1923 British continental services carried 10,066 pas-
sengers on 2,960 flights,6 in 1923 11,948 flew on 2,714 flights7 (these
figures include those on subsidized flights). Most of the gain in 1923
was attributable to larger aircraft.
Nevertheless, before the airlines had had a chance to see how the
"revised" scheme would work out in the summer months, the new
Conservative government decided upon a re-appraisal. Sir Samuel
Hoare, Secretary of State for Air, appointed a committee of his former
commercial associates8 to look into the whole business.
The Hambling Committee reported in February 1923. The gov-
ernment announced acceptance of its proposals in March.9 After exam-
ining each of the previous schemes, the Committee came to the
conclusion that not one of the companies had sufficient financial
resources to enable it to become financially attractive to investors.
Without this asset no company could raise the capital required for the
necessary extension of services, for only on the longer distances could
aircraft compete advantageously with surface transport. Perhaps influ-
enced by the current re-grouping of the railways, the Report (Cmd.
1811) proposed the formation of a company with £1,000,000 capital,
a monopoly of routes, and a subsidy of £1,000,000 repayable over ten
years.
Though without aeronautical experience, the Committee gave
sound advice, particularly with respect to the company-State relation-
4 Cmd. 1811 (1923), is the basic document for this early period and contains
statistics and a brief history of the years 1919-1923. The agreement of March 1921
was embodied in Cmd. 1521 (1921).
5 Cmd. 1811 (1923).
6 Cmd. 1900 (1923).
7 Cmd. 2210 (1924).
8 The Committee was composed of: Herbert Hambling, Joseph G. Broodbank,
and Sir Samuel's brother, Oliver V. G. Hoare. For their relationship see 160 H.C.
Deb. 5. s., 2161-2162, 1 March 1923.
9 161 H.C. Deb. 5. s., 1618-1621, 14 March 1923.
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ship. It appears to have thought the million-pound monopoly would
be sufficient to encourage the company to develop routes without
additional subsidy. The Report further stipulated that the subsidy
should be paid in decreasing instalments and that none should be paid
until certain minimum services and developments had taken place.
Above all else, the Committee insisted the new company be run as a
commercial affair with the object of making it self-supporting in one
decade.
The government promptly invited proposals. Two sets were sub-
mitted.10 The Instone scheme, based upon their company's wide
knowledge of international shipping, envisaged a steady development
of services, dwindling subsidies and financial independence in eight
years. The other three companies (Handley Page, Daimler, and
B.M.A.N.) combined with a financial house under the control of
Frederick Szarvasy, the saviour of the Dunlop Rubber Company and
others. George Holt-Thomas, the founder of Aircraft Transport &
Travel, was their spokesman. Negotiations dragged on with the Air
Ministry all summer until the Instones were forced to join forces with
the others. In December an Agreement (Cmd. 2010) was signed be-
tween the government and the British, Foreign and Colonial Corp.,
the above-mentioned financial house. This contract provided solely
for European services and a minimum number of flights, a feature the
Hambling Committee had thought unworthy of good management.
The new monopoly company, Imperial Airways, was only registered
just before it was due to take over operations on 1 April 1924.11
III
Imperial Airways had an ill-omened beginning. Its formation had
been delayed by the advent in January 1924 of the first Labor govern-
ment in Britain and its operations were suspended by pilot troubles
throughout April. Though brought into being to maintain British
prestige in Europe, the company soon gave up its services to all but
Paris, Zurich, Brussels and Cologne. Until 1938 its European schedules
were conducted with obsolete biplanes, while its share of the London-
Paris traffic dropped from over 60% in the early days to less than
40% by the time the Cadman Committee investigated in 1937/38.12
10 The Instone scheme was drawn up in some detail, printed, and presented
to the Air Ministry in May 1923. It envisaged services gradually radiating from
Britain to the Middle East and India as well as to Europe. The only piece of the
rival scheme which has come into my hands indicated merely an increase in Euro-
pean services.
11 Subsidy and other costs to the Government for the years 1921-1924 were as
follows:
To De Havilland Air Taxi ...................... £1,722
Daimler Airway .......................... £96,094
Handley Page Transport .................. £94,472
Instone Air Line ........................ £119,234
British Marine Air Navigation ............ £.. 4,024
To all the companies in gifts of aircraft ........ £65,027
Total: £380,573
12 Cmd. 5685 (1938), 82.
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The answer to the inevitable query is simple: on the one hand, the
company was told in 1928 that its mission was imperial, and on the
other, the British government refused to face economic facts. The
company increasingly faced competition from well-subsidized, nation-
alized rivals with modern equipment, not to mention smaller British
operators who flew faster and cheaper over the same routes without
State-aidl
The British government in the early 'twenties was gravely con-
cerned with other economic problems and it believed overseas airlines
could develop without subsidies; a faith which conditions did not
justify. Moreover, increasing tension with France necessitated a new
look at defense. As a result the report on Imperial Defense of the
Salisbury Committee was accepted.' 3 This committed the government
to a five-year plan to raise an R.A.F. Home Defense force of 52 squad-
rons by 1928. In addition, in 1924 the Labor government adopted the
Burney Airship Scheme (for trans-Atlantic services) and ordered two
dirigibles for services to India and South Africa. Over £1,000,000 was
expended upon this chimera which ended with the crash of R. 101
on her maiden flight. 14
The Hambling Report indicated that £1,000,000 in subsidy would
be sufficient for imperial development if the company raised an equal
capital sum. Imperial Airways, however, proceeded to obtain addi-
tional subsidies for each new sector over and above development work
and facilities provided by the R.A.F. By 1935 its subsidy amounted to
some £500,000 annually. Nor did it raise more than 64% of the re-
quired capital until 1936/37. The government avoided re-thinking
the problem until 1936, being content until then with taking credit
for the achievements of Imperial Airways while disowning all problems
as the commercial concern of the company.
The various agreements 5 made with the company from 1924 were
consolidated into Cmd. 3143 in 1928. This was a victory for Sir Eric
Geddes, former railwayman, Minister of Transport, chairman of both
the Dunlop Rubber Company and Imperial Airways, and notorious
for his toughness and his "Axe." It granted the company both secrecy
in regard to contract details and first option on any new routes which
the London government might subsidize. This latter weapon enabled
it to deprive the Cobham-Blackburn organization of the fruits of their
pioneering of a Cairo-South African route and to prevent any other
British company obtaining a subsidy until 1936. Thus this private
company enjoyed an ultra-privileged position in regard to subsidies,
while at the same time to its disadvantage it played a semi-public role
in imperial strategy.
'3 Lord Templewood (Sir Samuel Hoare), Empire of the Air, 1922-1929, Lon-
don, 1957, gives the Air Minister's view of these years.
14 For the dramatic study of this disaster see James Leasor, The Millionth
Chance, London, 1957.
'5 Cmd. 2010 (1923), Cmd. 2574 (1925), and Cmd. 2758 (1926).
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The Air Council, the policy-making apex of the Air Ministry, ended
World War I with some far-sighted plans for imperial defense, but
these were soon pigeon-holed. Pioneer work was done, however, to
provide a string of airfields from Cairo to both South Africa and to
the Straits Settlements. Proving flights were made over the former by
Brand and van Ryneveldt and over the latter by the Smith brothers.
Thereafter these routes were neglected until Imperial Airways ex-
tended its operations.
In 1926 Imperial Airways was assigned the task of operating the
Desert Air Route from Cairo to Basra in place of the R.A.F. Opera-
tions commenced in early 1927, though the planned service through
to Karachi was blocked by Persia until 1929. After a further diplomatic
impasse in 1931, the route was transferred to the Arabian Coast of the
Persian Gulf as the R.A.F. had originally desired. This is but one
example of a number of delays which might have been eliminated if
the company had had the full financial, political and diplomatic
support which as the government's "chosen instrument" it deserved.
From 1926 to 1937 the company pioneered lines from Cairo to
London, the Cape and Delhi. After the worst of the depression wore
off and Indian government obstructionism ceased in 1933, it added a
line to Singapore to link up with the Australian service to the Antipo-
des. In 1934 agreements were reached with Italy and France for air-
borne, instead of rail, connections from Paris to Brindisi. However,
lack of aircraft till 1937 prevented all but token mail flights. And in
the last years before the war Bermuda-New York and trans-Atlantic
services were inaugurated in conjunction with Pan-American Airways.
Until 1930 Chief of the Air Staff Sir Hugh Trenchard had to spend
much of his time defending the unity of the R.A.F. from the scalpels
of the Army and Navy and its budget from economy-minded politi-
cians. Though the Salisbury Committee confirmed the R.A.F. as the
permanent third service in 1923, inter-service bickering has continued
down to today's struggle over missile control.
Given this situation, the government cannot, perhaps, be blamed
entirely for failing to see clearly in the years 1924-1935 the strategic
imperial role which in an off-handed way it was expecting Imperial
Airways to play. Churchill's dictum, reinforced by that of the Hambling
Report, had been firmly planted in Conservative minds. Labor de-
manded the internationalization of air transport, if not all civil avia-
tion. And Sir Eric insisted on dividends before development to encour-
age capital investment. Is it at all surprising that few people should
have seen the true role of the monopoly outside of Europe?
And yet there were signposts. K.L.M. was used to link the Dutch
East Indies to the Netherlands; Deutsch Luft Hansa was a nationalized,
if not nationalistic, organization; and Air France, after its creation in
1933, was an instrument of national prestige and policy. Ironically, the
latter two were inspired by the formation of Imperial Airways. A clue
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to the official British mind of the time may be had in the constant pride
shown over Imperial Airways' safety record to the complete neglect
of the essential asset of air travel-speedl
Rearmament brought with it a major reappraisal of the position of
the monopoly company. At the end of 1934 the government announced
that in 1936/37 it would initiate the Empire Air Mail Scheme under
which all first-class mail to the Empire would be flown at the 1 i/2d
rate.16 This scheme was in part the work of Imperial Airways which
had come to realize by 1932 that the limits of surcharged mail traffic
had been reached and suggested a reappraisal of the ideas raised in the
earlier Air Conferences. 17 Its suggestion coincided with question of
the renewal of its charter, with French disarmament proposals, and
with the reorientation of British foreign policy due to Hitler. 8 Con-
sciously or not, the Empire Air Mail Scheme, subsidy for British Air-
ways, and the development of routes to West Africa and South America
must be considered as part of a whole strategic realignment of policy.
As a consequence of such thinking the laissez-faire view of overseas
airlines of Churchill and Hambling came to be abandoned.
IV
In 1935 a new Interdepartmental Committee on International Air
Communications under the chairmanship of the Permanent Secretary
to the Treasury, Sir Warren Fisher, examined the whole British posi-
tion. Its recommendation made British Airways into the second "chosen
instrument" in 1936.
This new company had just been created by banking and aero-
nautical interests closely allied with the railways' traditional enemies,
the motorbus operators. Capt. Harold Balfour (later Under-Secretary
of State for Air, 1938-1944), a director of both British Airways and of
the financial house of Whitehall Securities, had long been a prominent
critic in Parliament of Imperial Airways. By 1935 the older monopoly
was not only assailed for its connections with the railways through
Railway Air Services whose personnel Imperial Airways supplied, but
also for its antique biplanes, which were far slower than the American-
built monoplanes of its European rivals.
Advisory committees had stressed the importance of civil aviation
to the war-potential of the aircraft industry. Contracts with Imperial
Airways had been drawn with this in mind. 9 Yet the company neither
16 296 H.C. Deb. 5. s., 1328-1331, 20 Dec. 1934.
17 See Cmd. 1157 (1920) and Cmd. 1619 (1922).
18 The turning point in Britain came with the following Debates in Parliament:
281 H.C. Deb. 5. s., 579-702, 13 Nov. 1933; 90 H.L. Deb. 5. s., 163-193, 29 Nov. 1933;
90 H.L. Deb. 5. s., 346-385, 7 Dec. 1933.
19 Cmd. 2574 (1925). It had been found that the requirement for a minimum
number of flights encouraged the use of single-engined aircraft. The change was
designed to encourage the use of multi-engined planes by using a horsepower-
mileage basis rather than pure mileage.
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raised the capital called for by the Hambling Report" nor did it order,
until the Empires and Ensigns were contracted for in 1934, more than
eight aircraft at a time.21 Not only were all its aircraft hand-crafted,
but also the company used them on first-class services long after the
four-year amortization period had passed. However, Imperial Airways
alone was not to blame. The Air Ministry did not possess a modern
transport aircraft for government use from about 1924 until just before
the war in 1939.22
In 1934 Imperial Airways had ordered 30 Empire flying-boats from
Short Brothers. These began to appear in 1936 and a considerable
improvement in Empire services began. However, the Armstrong-
Whitworth Ensign landplanes ordered for the Continental services
were so delayed in production by the rearmament of the R.A.F. as to
be obsolescent by the time they went into service in 1938/39. As
they were withdrawn for modifications almost at once, British services
to the Continent had to be operated by small, sleek De Havilland
Frobishers or stately old biplanes.
There were other serious areas of neglect. By 1936 there were no
British services to the all important North German-Scandinavian area
and no regular British night services in Europe at all. It was into this
void that the firms joined in British Airways sought access.
Though in 1936 Imperial Airways appeared to be under official
pressure to give up its monopoly of the area north of the line London-
Berlin to British Airways, it actually attempted to get the latter to
operate all Continental services. Similarly, Imperial Airways and the
Post Office had failed to develop services to South America, despite
considerable British business interests there. The Post Office had been
content to pay some £150,000 a year in gold francs to the French and
German authorities for the use of their services to West Africa and
South America. British Airways was granted this field, too, with the
government paying the costs of all exploratory work and guaranteeing
a subsidy when services should begin. However, no British service
20 Up to 1936 the company had never raised more than £650,000 of the £1,000,-
000 required. The purchase of some 44 new aircraft on order from 1934 required
the issuance of another £1,000,000 of shares in 1936. Judging by the borrowing
powers accorded B.O.A.C. in its establishment Act, the company was still under-
capitalized for the duties it had to perform.
21 Imperial Airways ordered: 3 Argosies in 1925/26, 4 Argosies in 1927/28,
5 Hercules in 1926/27, 5 Calcuttas in 1928, 3 Kents in 1931, 8 Hannibal/Heracles
in 1929/31 and 8 Atalantas in 1930/33. The above orders were spread out over
three different firms: there were also some smaller orders to a few other companies.
This was hardly enough to maintain the industry's war potential. Except for the
second batch of Argosies, all of these aircraft were ordered off the drawing boards,
as were the Short Empires of 1934-37.
22 After sponsoring a contest for civil aeroplanes in 1920, the Air Ministry
bought an aircraft here and there for evaluation, but was content to make use of
modifications of the 1918 Vickers Vimy bomber for most of the inter-war period.
No. 216 Squadron in Cairo in 1940 was still flying modified Vimys! About 1936 the
Air Ministry accepted some Bristol and Handley Page bomber-transports while at
the same time beginning to encourage the design of real transport aircraft. The
first of these designs, the DH 91 Albatross was a trans-Atlantic mailplane which,
with true logic, Imperial Airways used on the London-Paris run. The Fairey four-
engined pressurized monoplane, which would have rivalled the DC 4, was cancelled
when war broke out.
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operated this route until after World War II due to failure to obtain
permission to cross Spain. This was just one more example of the kind
of diplomatic and technical snag which should have been overcome, if
for no other reason than prestige, before it frustrated vital services.
In 1937 the newly-instituted Imperial Airways service to Budapest
suffered from icing of aircraft and engines; British aircraft were unable
to operate to Switzerland in winter weather; Imperial Airways aircraft
flew at about 110 m.p.h. compared with the nearly 200 m.p.h. of the
new American monoplanes of K.L.M., Swissair, and British Airways,
not to mention new French types; Imperial Airways was paying ever
larger dividends, 9% in 1937 plus an increase in directors' fees, while
at the same time discharging pilots who attempted to organize a union.
Subsidized Imperial Airways belonged to the "booking ban" (a prac-
tice which prevented travel agents from handling tickets for companies
not approved by the railways) organized by the railways against the
busmen's airlines. To crown it all, British Airways was refused adver-
tising space in The Imperial Airways Gazette, though Deutsch Luft
Hansa could obtain it. With Parliament and the public believing this
situation, trouble was bound to occur.
After failing to gain satisfaction for their demands through the
agency of the Guild of Air Pilots and Air Navigators, the pilots organ-
ized the British Airline Pilots' Association (B.A.L.P.A.). Fortunately,
one of the officers of the Association, Robert Perkins, was also a pug-
nacious M.P. He raised the question of the pilots and launched a
full-scale attack on both the Government and Imperial Airways, 23 with
the result that the Cadman Committee was created. At first it was
composed of civil servants. But upon protest to the prime Minister,
it was changed to include only private citizens.2 4
The Cadman Report (Cmd. 5685) did not mince words. It excori-
ated the Government for its failure to provide a full-time Under-
Secretary for Civil Aviation and called for a shakeup in the office of
the Director-General of Civil Aviation. It recommended the creation
of a joint company to run the London-Paris service (in place of allow-
ing British Airways and Imperial Airways to compete). It strongly
suggested the allocation to British Airways of most European services
and all lines to West Africa and South America, correctly contending
that Imperial Airways had enough to do with running services to South
23 328 H.C. Deb. 5. s., 404-413, 28 October 1937. 329 H.C. Deb. 5. s., 417-479,
17 November 1937.
24 328 H.C. Deb. 5. s., 404-413, 28 October 1937, and 329 H.C. Deb. 5. s., 417-
479, 17 November 1937. See 329 H.C. Deb. 5. s., 1218, 24 November 1937 and 329
H.C. Deb. 5. s., 1879-1880, 30 November 1937. The original committee consisted
of Lord Cadman of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as chairman, with Sir Warren
Fisher of the Treasury and Sir William Barrowclough Brown, long private secre-
tary to the Presidents of the Board of Trade, of whom one had been Sir Philip
Cunliffe-Lister, now, as Lord Swinton, Secretary of State for Air. The new com-
mittee retained Lord Cadman and added Sir Frederick Marquis (later Lord
Woolton) (a large Midlands retailer), T. Harrison Hughes (ship-owner and mem-
ber of the Suez Canal Company) and J. W. Bowen (General Secretary of the
Union of Postal Workers).
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Africa, Australia, Hong Kong and across the Atlantic. It pointed to
the need for greatly increased subsidies and better aircraft.
Its most biting words were reserved for the management of Imperial
Airways. Its chairman, Sir Eric Geddes, had succumbed in the summer
of 1937 with the result that the odium fell upon the trusted Managing-
Director, who thus became a victim of circumstances. The Report
characterized the company's labor relations as poor and called for
drastic changes, commented adversely on its services in Europe, and
called its attitude towards the government unyielding and unbecoming
to an organization in receipt of such large sums of public money.25
The government accepted the Report and at once initiated proceedings
for changes.
In the meantime Parliamentary criticism of the fact that the Secre-
tary of State for Air sat in the Lords and that the performance of the
Under-Secretary in the House of Commons was mediocre led to a
change in command. Sir Kingsley Wood succeeded Lord Swinton and
Harold Balfour became Under-Secretary.
The Cadman Report had recommended a full-time chairman for
Imperial Airways, Sir Eric Geddes having been principally chairman of
the Dunlop Rubber Company. After an embarrassingly long search
the government solved two problems at once. Sir John (later Lord)
Reith was persuaded to leave his impartial management of the British
Broadcasting Corporation and to take command of the airline. He
agreed to move on condition the principal overseas airlines were
nationalized. Both the government and the directors of Imperial Air-
ways reluctantly swallowed the pill. Reith took over in July and
nationalization was announced on 11 November after the completion
of the basic plans.26 Valuations were made, and the stockholders of
both Imperial Airways and British Airways agreed to sell in the follow-
ing June. The British Overseas Airways Bill was introduced into Parlia-
ment in the summer and received the royal assent on 4 August. Thus
was created the British Overseas Airways Corporation with vast bor-
rowing powers. The Corporation was expected to take over the older
companies on 1 April 1940, but in fact war caused the creation of a
national air transport organization in the Autumn of 1939.
V
The British Government's policy in regard to civil air transport
was in many respects in odd contrast to its attitude in most other
25 In fiscal 1934 Imperial Airways subsidy was £561,556 and postal payments
added another £290,000. Imperial Airways revenue from all government sources in
1934 was £857,954 out of a total revenue of £1,197,807 on which a profit of £133,769
was realized to the benefit of private stockholders. (Cmd. 5685 (1938) and 309
H.C. Deb. 5. s., 454-455, 26 Feb. 1936.) With the Empire Air Mail Scheme the com-
pany's revenues from government sources mounted rapidly. Examination of the
evidence presented to the Cadman Committee by Imperial Airways and talks with
the former Managing Director, Mr. George Woods-Humphrey, as well as historical
insight make the strictures against the management open to considerable reserva-
tions, if not complete revision.
26 341 H.C. Deb. 5. s., 453-455, 11 Nov. 1938.
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matters economic. Foreign interference with the development of routes
was based upon the false view of air space taken at the Paris Peace
Conference. Subsidies were pushed down an unwilling Government's
throat by the actions of other powers and were rarely granted with the
Imperial purpose in mind. Help was, however, provided by the R.A.F.
for the establishment of many routes.
The Government was probably most to blame when it failed to
make Imperial Airways live up to its obligations, both legal and
implied. Though the Cadman Committee blamed the Managing-Direc-
tor for taking too commercial a view of his responsibilities, he was by
no means entirely to blame, for had not the Government of 1923
insisted that the million-pound-monopoly company was to be a com-
mercial affair? Moreover, Sir Eric Geddes was a hard driving person-
ality with ample experience of the Government and its officials, and
the Cadman Report would seem to indicate his determination to place
dividends first, a distinctly commercial view.
The question of personal interests and the pressure of politics
cannot be overlooked. Except for the two brief interludes of Labor
government in 1924 and 1929-1931, the Conservatives were in power
and reluctant to interfere with business. The majority of the Secre-
taries of State for Air were enthusiasts, including Labor's Lord Thom-
son who paid for his devotion with his life, but they always had to
concentrate on the preservation or expansion of the R.A.F. and to
battle half the year with the annual budget. That these politicians did
not see the importance of civil aviation must not be held too heavily
against them, for neither did the Air Council. The Air Ministry's
interest in transport aircraft remained apathetic long after the Russians
and others had demonstrated the use of paratroops and after British
experience in the Middle East and India had shown their possibilities.
The 1923 decision to create only one monopoly company is, today,
open to serious question. British policy has vacillated between one and
several companies. In 1939 B.O.A.C. absorbed Imperial Airways and
British Airways as Imperial Airways had taken over the older organiza-
tions in 1924, but in 1946 three companies were established. After a
short independent existence British South American Airways was
reabsorbed by B.O.A.C. while British European Airways remains as a
comparative-cost yardstick. Greater things might have been achieved
if the three older companies and their financiers had been granted the
European monopoly in which they had some background, while the
Instones, the only ones with wide commercial experience abroad, had
been given the Empire routes with full recognition of th6ir imperial
mission.
What has been said above must not, however, allow the reader to
overlook the very real achievements of that small band who labored
under many human and geographical handicaps to stretch British air
routes from New York to Europe, South Africa, the Far East and
Australia. It was these men, not the politicians, who laid the founda-
tions for B.O.A.C.
